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In her article, ‘‘Perfection, Happiness, and Duties to Self,’’ Diane Jeske
attempts to revive the philosophical discussion concerning the notion of
duties to self and duties to others ‘‘by showing the interest of Kants view
on the topic and by showing how we can build on and modify Kants
suggestions.’’1 Speciﬁcally, Jeske claims to modify and build on Kants
view in order to justify her three notions of direct duties, which she
apparently takes to be insuﬃciently justiﬁable on purely Kantian
grounds. She essentially argues that, by itself, Kants view is ill-suited to
deal with speciﬁc aspects of duties to self and to others. As a result, Jeske
uses an amalgamation of her view and Kants view to justify three types of
duties: a duty to promote the perfection of others, a duty to promote the
happiness of only our own intimates such as our friends and family
members, and a duty to promote the happiness of our future selves.
The support Jeske oﬀers for each of her three notions of duties
represents an unnecessary divergence from Kants unamended ethical
position. In order to accurately correct Jeskes position regarding the
supposed inability of Kants ethical position to adequately deal with
speciﬁc aspects of duties to self and others, we must consider the rela-
tionship between Kants conceptions of virtue and happiness within the
context of the highest good. The thesis to be defended here is that by
examining Kants un-amended position regarding the relation between
virtue and happiness within the context of the highest good, we are able to
gain a clear understanding of Kants conception of the duties of self-
perfection and beneﬁcence, which can then be used to correct Jeskes use
of Kants work on ethics to help justify her three types of duties.
1. Jeskes Justiﬁcation of Her Three Duties
Jeske clearly states that her view accords with Kants view in places and is
contrary to Kants view in others. The main focus of her discussion is to
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build on and modify Kants view in such a way as to support the speciﬁc
types of duties that she proposes. With this goal in mind, Jeske oﬀers an
amalgam of Kants view and her own view to justify her three speciﬁc
types of duties.
Jeske begins defending her ﬁrst type of duty, a duty to promote the
perfection of others, by indicating that categorical imperatives issue in
duties that apply to all moral agents. She states, ‘‘categorical imperatives
are those that command some action regardless of the contingent sub-
jective states of the agent…categorical imperatives can also be tied to the
promotion of objective value. If a state of aﬀairs is objectively valuable,
then any agent in a position to do so has reason to promote that state of
aﬀairs; i.e., there is an agent-neutral reason to promote it. So an agent
having an agent-neutral reason to promote a state of aﬀairs is indepen-
dent of her wanting to bring about that state of aﬀairs. She ought to have
that state of aﬀairs as one of her ends.’’2
Jeske maintains that categorical imperatives are duties that apply to all
moral agents and thereby supply all moral agents with a reason for
action. The reason for action, here, is agent-neutral because it aims at an
objectively valuable end; and since the end is objectively valuable, all
moral agents should adopt it as their own, individual end. One such
objectively valuable end, Jeske claims, is the well-being of human beings.3
While Jeske does not take up the task of deﬁning human well-being, she
does indicate that it involves the perfection of our natures, experiencing
some pleasures or, at the least, the avoidance of pain and suﬀering, and
the fulﬁllment of basic human needs.4 This conception of human well-
being is objective insofar as it allows agents to evaluate the well-being of
others from an agent-neutral position independent of their individual
subjective tastes and desires.5 Thus, according to Jeske, ‘‘there is a cate-
gorical imperative requiring us to promote the well-being of ourselves and
of others, where well-being is partially constituted by perfection of our
rational and moral natures.’’6
We can see how Jeske is able to draw the conclusion that we have a
duty to promote the perfection of others. She concludes that all agents
have a categorical duty to promote the perfection of their own rational
moral natures and the rational moral natures of others, since all agents
have the categorical duty to promote as an objective end the well-being of
humanity, and human well-being is partially constituted by the perfection
of the rational and moral nature of ourselves and others. Jeske ends her
justiﬁcation for this type of duty by saying, ‘‘And so we can agree with
Kant that we have duties to ourselves to promote our own perfection. But
we have not seen a reason to deny that we also have duties to others to
promote their perfection.’’7 Jeske is apparently successful in arguing that
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we can build on and modify Kants position to support the claim that we
have a duty to not only promote our own moral and rational perfection
but also the moral and rational perfection of others.
Among the constituents of well-being, Jeske includes pleasure, which
she takes to be the deﬁning characteristic of happiness. Siding with her
interpretation of Kant, Jeske maintains that happiness is a purely sub-
jective end, since it is up to an individual to determine what will make her
happy. Consequently, Jeske thinks that well-being has a subjective aspect,
happiness, because it involves experiencing pleasure of some sort. How-
ever, she maintains that we only have a duty to promote the well-being of
humanity, particularly the perfection of natures and the fulﬁllment of
basic needs of ourselves and others, which need not be the subjective end
of happiness.8 This seems reasonable, since it is highly probable that if
our individual basic needs are met and we are allowed to freely pursue the
perfection of our own natures, then we will experience happiness along
the way.
To support her second type of duty, a duty to promote the happiness
of only our own intimates, Jeske argues that while we have a direct,
positive duty to promote the well-being of all agents, we do not have a
direct, positive duty to promote the happiness of all others, since such an
end is merely subjective and thereby cannot be a dictate of the categorical
imperative.9 However, if the other person in question is an individuals
best friend, the individual should take the best friends subjective ends as a
reason for action, since friendship requires us to promote the subjective
ends of our friends.10 Jeske contends: ‘‘I have duties to promote the
happiness of certain other persons, namely my intimates: my friends and
family members, at the least…to whatever extent my doing so does not
conﬂict with my promotion of their well-being.’’11 According to Jeske,
then, we have a direct duty to promote the subjective ends of our own
intimates, their happiness in particular, and this duty stems from the
intimate relationship we have with them.
Regarding her third type of duty, a duty to promote our own future
happiness, Jeske refers to Kants claim that we cannot have a direct duty
to promote our own happiness because each of us, due to our animal
natures, naturally has our own happiness as an end, and we cannot have a
duty to pursue an end that we naturally tend toward.12 However, Jeske
indicates: ‘‘we can notice that even if we are all inclined to promote our
own present happiness, it is surely not the case that we are all inclined to
promote our own future happiness. The happiness of myself at sixty is
something that I may completely neglect or even hinder by smoking,
drinking, and laziness.’’13 Jeske is apparently making the following
argument. First, while we may have a natural inclination to promote our
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own present happiness, we do not have a natural inclination to promote
our individual future happiness. Second, since we have a duty to promote
the happiness of our intimates and we individually have a more inti-
mate relationship with ourselves than any others, and we are not natu-
rally inclined to promote our own future happiness, we can conclude that
we have a duty to promote our own future happiness.
In summation of her position, Jeske indicates that her aim is to revive
the philosophical discussion concerning the notion of duties to self and to
others by demonstrating how we can both build on and modify Kants
position regarding such duties. In so doing, Jeske oﬀers justiﬁcation for
three types of direct duties: a duty to promote not only our own indi-
vidual perfection but also that of others, a duty to promote the happiness
of only our own intimates, and a duty to promote the happiness of our
future selves.
2. Kants Conception of Obligatory Ends, Happiness,
and the Highest Good
Let us examine particular aspects of Kants ethical position that are
directly related to Jeskes position: Kants conceptions of obligatory ends
and happiness. Furthermore, to adequately understand the Kantian
duties to self and others, let us also consider the relation between virtue
and happiness within the context of the highest good.
Kant contends that a good will is the supreme good for human beings.
While a good will is the supreme good and the only good without qual-
iﬁcation, it is not the only end that moral agents ought to seek. There are
other ends that we are morally obligated to pursue, which means that they
are also duties, and the ends we ought to adopt must be established
according to moral principles.14 As a result, obligatory ends are to be
determined not by inclination, but solely by the moral law. What ends
other than the development of a good will do all agents have a duty to
adopt? According to Kant, we have a duty to adopt the following ends as
our own ends: the end of self-perfection, the end of the happiness of
others, and the end of actualizing the highest good.15
These three types of ends involve imperfect duties, since the maxims of
ends implicated here do not prescribe speciﬁc actions, only the adoption
of a purpose or end. For Kant, there are two general categories of duty,
perfect and imperfect. Perfect duties require agents to engage in speciﬁc
actions or omit particular actions, and they admit of no latitude in
performing such actions. Perfect duties do not aﬀord agents the freedom
to decide for themselves when and how to fulﬁll the duties.16 Conversely,
244 KEITH BUSTOS
imperfect duties merely prescribe general ends and allow for latitude in
their fulﬁllment. For example, agents have an imperfect duty to promote
the happiness of others, but agents are granted the freedom to judge
whose happiness they should promote and to what degree. This freedom
should not be interpreted as permitting agents to make arbitrary excep-
tions when fulﬁlling imperfect duties. Instead, we are only permitted to
‘‘limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g., love of ones neighbor in
general by love of ones parents).’’17 As long as our freedom in pursuing
obligatory ends is limited solely by competing duties, the only other
requirement is that we actively contribute to the realization of obligatory
ends.18
The ﬁrst obligatory end to be dealt with here is the end of self-
perfection, which carries with it the duty of self-perfection. In The
Metaphysics of Morals Kant divides duties of this type into negative
duties to ourselves and positive duties to ourselves. Negative duties are
duties of omission, and in the context of a duty of self-perfection we are
morally forbidden to act contrary to the end of our nature. We are
required to preserve ourselves in the perfection of our nature.19 Positive
duties are duties of commission, and in the current context we are morally
commanded to engage in actions that promote the perfect our moral
capacities. We are to make ourselves more perfect than nature alone has
made us.20
Since the end of self-perfection is an obligatory end, it is also a duty,
but it is an imperfect duty, prescribing no speciﬁc actions. While we are
aﬀorded the freedom to determine for ourselves the degree to which this
end is to be fulﬁlled, our freedom is constrained by certain perfect,
negative duties. In particular, there are speciﬁc vices, which are deﬁned as
actions based on maxims that inherently contradict the moral law,
associated with the end of self-perfection that are to be universally
avoided. The vices to be avoided are self-murder, the unnatural use of our
sexual inclinations, the consumption of food and drink in such an excess
that weakens our own capacity for self-determination, lying, avarice, and
false humility.21
The second obligatory end is that of the happiness of others, which
includes both the happiness and the moral well-being of others. The
associated imperfect duty here is the duty of beneﬁcence, which Kant also
divides into a positive duty and a negative duty. We have a positive duty
to promote the happiness of others according to our individual means.22
We have a negative duty concerning the moral well-being of others to
‘‘refrain from doing anything that, considering the nature of a human
being, could tempt him to do something for which his conscience could
afterwards pain him, to refrain from what is called giving scandal.’’23
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As with the duty of self-perfection, the duty of beneﬁcence does not
prescribe speciﬁc positive actions. It only requires that we actively
participate in the fate of others in such a way that we promote their
happiness and moral well-being.
Regarding the ends of self-perfection and the happiness of others,
Kant warns, ‘‘Perfection and happiness cannot be interchanged here, so
that ones own happiness and the perfection of others would be made
ends that would be in themselves duties of the same person.’’24 We may
ask why it is that we cannot have direct duties to pursue our own hap-
piness and the perfection others. The reason is that we cannot have a duty
to directly pursue our own happiness, because we all have natural incli-
nations to seek our own happiness. Duty often conﬂicts with our natural
inclinations, since duty requires agents to limit their natural inclinations
in the pursuit of fulﬁlling the requirements of the moral law. Kant
maintains that what we inevitably and spontaneously will ‘‘does not come
under the concept of duty, which is constraint to an end adopted reluc-
tantly. Hence it is self-contradictory to say that he under obligation to
promote his own happiness with all his powers.’’25 We may also ask why
it is that we cannot have a duty to directly pursue the perfection of other
agents. The answer to this involves the notion that ‘‘ought’’ implies
‘‘can,’’ from which it follows that we can only be morally obligated to
pursue those ends that we have the ability to pursue. Concerning the
perfection of others, we cannot be morally obligated to perfect others,
since we lack control over their subjective wills. Furthermore, to have a
duty to control the lives of other agents so as to ensure their perfection
would necessitate the usurpation of their freedom of self-determination.26
Hence, we do not and cannot have a direct duty to promote our own
happiness or to promote the perfection of other agents.
The third obligatory end relevant here is that of the highest good. Kant
uses the term ‘‘highest good’’ in an ambiguous way in his ethical works.
For example, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant uses
‘‘highest good’’ to refer to a good will, while in the Critique of Practical
Reason, he uses the term ‘‘highest good’’ to refer to happiness in
proportion to morality.27 However, Kant states that the term ‘‘highest’’
can mean either supreme or perfect, and he resolves the ambiguity by
referring to the good will as the supreme good and happiness in pro-
portion to morality as the highest good.28 Consequently, the highest good
as an obligatory end is deﬁned in the following way. Kant writes:
‘‘Inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of
the highest good for one person, and happiness in the exact proportion to
morality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy)
constitutes that of a possible world, the highest good means the whole, the
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perfect good, wherein virtue is always the supreme good, being the con-
dition having no condition superior to it, while happiness, thought
something always pleasant to him who possesses it, is not of itself abso-
lutely good in every respect but always presupposes conduct in accor-
dance with the moral law as its condition.’’29
From this passage, we can see that Kant employs two conceptions of
the highest good: the highest good as happiness in proportion to virtue
for one person, and the highest good as happiness in the exact proportion
to morality. The ﬁrst can be understood as an individual obligatory end,
meaning that it is our duty to promote to the best of our ability the
happiness of some individuals in this world. The second can be conceived
of as a social or collective obligatory end that is aimed at happiness for all
agents in exact proportion to morality, which exists as a possible world.30
Additionally, that conception of the highest good is the whole, perfect
good and the ultimate end of morality.
While pursuing the highest good, happiness is to always be subordi-
nated to morality. Morality must be the sole determinant of the will and
the happiness sought is at all times conditioned by morality.31 Kant notes:
‘‘Only with this subordination is the highest good the entire object of pure
practical reason, which pure practical reason must necessarily think as
possible because reason commands us to contribute everything possible to
its realization.’’32 Contrary to what was established while discussing the
ﬁrst two obligatory ends, we can see that we have a direct positive duty to
promote to the best of our ability the happiness of all agents, including
our own happiness. We must remember that the sort of happiness that is a
duty to promote is not happiness as a natural end, which is unconditioned
and conditionally good, but morally conditioned happiness. When
directly pursuing morally conditioned happiness for ourselves and others,
we are to be mindful that our respective wills ought to always be deter-
mined solely by morality.
As we saw, Jeske considers happiness to be a purely subjective notion,
and she explicitly states that Kant shares such a notion of happiness.
However, Jeske understands Kant to oﬀer an opaque conception of
happiness, thereby failing to help us understand the duty of beneﬁcence.33
A close reading of The Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Prac-
tical Reason suggests that Kant does in fact have a clear, robust notion of
happiness. It seems reasonable to claim, as Jeske might, that Kants
conception of happiness is at times diﬃcult to pin down and at other
times seemingly confused, since he apparently uses diﬀerent terms such as
‘‘well-being,’’ ‘‘pleasure,’’ ‘‘bliss,’’ and ‘‘contentment’’ as though they are
synonyms for ‘‘happiness.’’ More importantly, if we are not able to
accurately understand Kants deﬁnition of happiness and its relationship
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to morality, we will inevitably misunderstand Kants overall moral aim
not to mention our duty of beneﬁcence, which requires us to promote the
happiness of others.
While Kant does in fact have a clear notion of happiness, he may be
interpreted as oﬀering not just one but two conceptions of happiness:
happiness as desire satisfaction, representing material satisfaction with
what nature bestows, and happiness as contentment, representing moral
satisfaction that stems from virtuous action. Such a bifurcated interpre-
tation is ultimately incorrect, since, in the Critique of Practical Reason,
Kant explicitly restricts the deﬁnition of happiness as referring only to
sensuous gratiﬁcation. He writes: ‘‘Do we not have a word to denote a
satisfaction with existence, an analogue of happiness which necessarily
accompanies the consciousness of virtue, and which does not indicate a
[sensuous] gratiﬁcation, as happiness does? We do, and this word is self-
contentment, which in its real meaning refers only to negative satisfaction
with existence in which one is conscious of needing nothing…and, so far
as I am conscious of freedom in obeying my moral maxims, it is the
exclusive source of an unchanging contentment necessarily connected
with it and resting on no particular feeling…Sensuous contentment
(improperly so called) which rests on the satisfaction of inclinations,
however reﬁned they may be, can never be adequate to that which is
conceived under contentment.’’34 To this he adds: ‘‘Thus we can under-
stand how the consciousness of...[virtue] can produce a consciousness of
mastery over inclinations and thus of independence from them
and…bring forth a negative satisfaction with ones condition, i.e., con-
tentment, whose source is contentment with ones own person.…This
cannot be called happiness, since it does not depend upon a positive
participation of feeling.’’35 ‘‘Happiness,’’ then, is deﬁned by Kant as
sensuous gratiﬁcation that necessarily depends upon a positive partici-
pation of feeling, whereas ‘‘self-contentment’’ is deﬁned as a negative
intellectual satisfaction that is necessarily dependent upon virtuous
action.
For Kant, the central problem of morality consists of two, often-
conﬂicting maxims, maxims of virtue and maxims of happiness. The main
problem with aiming directly at happiness is that it essentially involves the
feeling of pleasure, which itself is a faulty foundation for morality. There
are two reasons that the mere feeling of pleasure cannot be the foundation
of morality. Seeking pleasure never has an end, since once one desire is
sated, another desire ﬁlls its place, and we can never be sure that a
particular action will always result in the same pleasurable state for all
individuals who engage in the action. Mere feelings cannot stand as the
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foundation for morality. Instead, Kant believes, pure practical reason can
be the only sound foundation for morality.36
Kant considers it to be the case that the correct use of practical reason
is to seek virtue by subordinating the conditional good, happiness as our
natural end, to the unconditional good, the manifestation of a good will
through virtuous action. To act virtuously is to autonomously assert
control over our own passionate inclinations and to subordinate them to
the demands of a good will. Doing so requires the application of the
supreme principle of autonomy, and thus we arrive at moral principles for
action. Consequently, the only sort of happiness that we can truly deserve
is a sort that is conditioned by the good will, which is the indispensable
condition for our worthiness to be happy.37 This qualiﬁcation points to
the fact that our worthiness to be happy is found only in virtuous action,
which, paradoxically, is the willful act of surrendering our conditional
good, happiness, to the pursuit of the unconditional good, virtue.
Kant cautions us about the pitfall of allowing ourselves to cultivate
reason in such a way that it aims directly at enjoying life and natural
happiness. If we do, we will inevitably get caught in a vicious circle like a
eudaemonist who ‘‘can hope to be happy (or inwardly blissful) only if he
is conscious of having done his duty, but he can be moved to do his duty
only if he foresees that it will make him happy. When the reﬂective man
has overcome the incentives to vice and is conscious of having done his
often painful duty, he ﬁnds himself in a state which could well be called
happiness, a state of contentment and peace of soul in which virtue is its
own reward. Now the eudaemonist says: this delight or happiness is really
his motive for acting virtuously. The concept of duty does not determine
his will immediately; he is moved to do his duty only through the medium
of the happiness he foresees. But if he can expect this reward of virtue
only from consciousness of having done his duty, then obviously,
consciousness of having done his duty must come ﬁrst.’’38
To further understand why we cannot have a direct duty to pursue our
own natural end of happiness, we may consider the following possible
position. It might be argued that, in a way, we have a duty to pursue
natural happiness, contentment, and virtue simultaneously, since to
ascetically pursue virtue may result in akratically transgressing the moral
law. Some people might be tempted to claim that we have a direct duty to
pursue our own natural happiness and self-contentment, because we must
cultivate a pleasant disposition toward doing our duty in order to ensure
that we continuously acts in a virtuous manner. This position could be
supported by the fact that Kant understands pleasure to be an integral
component of the virtuous life: ‘‘what is not done with pleasure but
merely as compulsory service has no inner worth for one who attends to
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his duty in this way and such service is not loved by him; instead, he
shirks as much as possible occasions for practicing virtue…. Hence the
training (discipline) that a human being practices on himself can become
meritorious and exemplary only through the cheerfulness that accompa-
nies it.’’39
While Kant apparently agrees with the notion that the feeling of
happiness should accompany virtuous action, he would maintain that we
have an indirect duty to pursue our own feelings of happiness and a direct
duty to pursue virtue. Indirect duties are not duties per se, since they are
not aimed directly at a moral end. Instead, indirect duties are aimed at a
means that is valuable in pursuing a moral end. To say that we have an
indirect duty to pursue our own feeling of happiness is to indicate that our
own natural happiness plays an integral role as a means to the end of
becoming virtuous in that being physically satisﬁed with our material
state makes doing our duty easier than it would be without experiencing
feelings of happiness.
Nevertheless, we do not have a direct duty to promote the natural end
of humanity, happiness, which is always subjectively conditioned. To
have a direct duty to promote happiness as the natural end of humanity
would be to aim directly at promoting the feeling of pleasure. But each
obligatory end is determined by the moral law. Pleasure cannot be the
foundation of morality, and happiness is essentially constituted by
the feeling of pleasure. Hence, we cannot have a direct duty to promote
the feelings of happiness of humanity per se. If we were so obliged, it
seems that in having a direct duty to promote such feelings in others, we
would ultimately fail to treat humanity as an end in itself, since such a
duty would compel us to maximize pleasure and thus entice others to
become or continue to be slaves to their inclinations.
The following passage from The Metaphysics of Morals can support
this view: ‘‘But a human beings duty to himself as a moral being only
(without taking his animality into consideration) consists in what is
formal in the consistency of the maxims of his will with the dignity of
humanity in his person. It consists, therefore, in a prohibition against
depriving himself of prerogative of a moral being, that of acting in
accordance with principles…inner freedom, and so making himself a
plaything of the mere inclinations and hence a thing.’’40 Here, Kant is
explicitly referring to a duty to ourselves as moral beings, which entails a
duty to humanity in each of us. While a duty to humanity in our own
person diﬀers from a duty to humanity in others, the implied negative
duties apply to the entire category of humanity. In particular, the negative
duty speciﬁed in the passage involves a proscription against treating
humanity in general as a mere means. This means that we are to always
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treat humanity in all persons as an end in itself, which is to respect the
inner freedom of all persons to pursue virtue. If we were to have a direct
duty to promote the pleasure of others instead of their inner freedom,
then we would be tempting others to shirk their moral duty to ﬁrst and
foremost seek virtue in favor of seeking pleasure.41 Consequently, it seems
that we cannot have a direct duty to promote the mere feeling of hap-
piness in others, since if we did have such a duty it would not be aimed
directly at morality but directly at pleasure.
Here we can rely on Kants conception of the highest good to help
direct our understanding. By promoting the morally conditioned happi-
ness of others within the context of the highest good, we are actually
contributing to the realization of the highest good by helping to making
the route to virtue easier for others. The highest good as happiness in
proportion to virtue, then, is the ﬁnal end of morality, and thereby the
ﬁnal end of humanity. Morally conditioned happiness as part of the
highest good is included in the direct object of morality, and thus morally
conditioned happiness of all agents is both an obligatory end and a direct
duty.
3. A Kantian Response to Jeske
A standard reading of Kants ethical position shows that we have a duty
to promote the highest good, which can be construed to include a direct
duty to promote the perfection of others. We have a duty to promote the
morally conditioned happiness of others, which involves a duty to pro-
mote the happiness of our intimates as well as others in general. We also
have a duty to promote our own perfection, which, in light of the highest
good, can be conceived of as involving a direct duty to promote our own
morally conditioned happiness.
Jeske argues that self-perfection and the perfection of others are
integral parts of well-being in general, and well-being is an objectively
valuable end. Since self-perfection and the perfection of others are
constituents of an objectively valuable end, Jeske contends that we each
have a duty to promote our own self-perfection and the perfection of
others. Kant explicitly agrees with the view Jeske advances, inasmuch as
all agents are charged with a duty to seek their own self-perfection, and he
can be understood as implicitly agreeing with her view insofar as agents
have a duty to promote the perfection of others. While we cannot have a
duty to ensure the perfect others, since we lack the control over them to
do so, in light of the highest good, we can conceive of having a direct duty
to promote the perfection of others by doing what we can to contribute to
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their moral development and by helping them to avoid the vices associ-
ated with self-perfection. We need to always act from the moral law. By
helping others in this morally conditioned way, we are helping them
further their freedom from inclinations, thereby both aiding the progress
of individuals toward their own moral perfection and contributing to the
realization of the highest good. A duty to promote the perfection of
others can be understood to be included in the duty of beneﬁcence within
the context of the highest good.
While Jeske agrees with Kant that happiness is a subjective end, she
thinks that we do not have a duty to promote the happiness of all others.
Instead, she argues that we have a duty to promote the happiness of only
people with whom we are intimate. This duty is apparently derived from
the intimate relationship we have with our own family and friends. Kant
would partially agree with Jeskes position here, by conceding that we
have a duty to promote the morally conditioned happiness of people with
whom we are intimate. However, he would disagree that we have a duty
to promote the morally conditioned happiness of only people with whom
we are intimate. As we have seen, Kant believes that we are morally
obligated to directly and actively pursue the end of the morally condi-
tioned happiness of others, and, in light of the highest good, we are to
directly and actively pursue the morally conditioned happiness of all
agents, including our own happiness.
Lastly, Jeske contends that we each have a duty to promote our
individual future happiness for the following reasons. First, we do not
have a natural inclination to promote our individual future happiness.
Second, since we have a duty to promote the happiness of people with
whom we are intimate and we individually have a more intimate rela-
tionship with ourselves than any others, we must have a duty to promote
our individual future happiness. Kant implicitly agrees with the position
Jeske sets out in that we each have a duty to promote our own future
happiness, but for diﬀerent reasons than she oﬀers. Kant explains that a
duty of self-perfection, by itself, involves an indirect duty of self-love
requiring all agents to obtain things that are ‘‘essential to the cheerful
enjoyment’’ of life.42 When considering the duties of self-perfection and
beneﬁcence in light of the highest good, we can conceive of all agents
having a direct positive duty to actively promote the morally conditioned
happiness of both their present and future selves. From a close look at the
obligatory ends of self-perfection, the happiness of others, and the highest
good, we can conceive of the duties of self-perfection and beneﬁcence as
involving direct duties to promote the perfection and the morally
conditioned happiness of all agents.
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